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George R. Williams 
Can the Psi Data Help 
Us Make Progress on the 
Problem of Consciousness? 
Abstract: The inherently subjective nature of consciousness severely 
limits our ability to make progress on the problem of consciousness. 
The inability to acquire objective, publicly available data on the 
phenomenal aspect of consciousness makes evaluating alternative 
theories very difficult, if not impossible. However, the anomalous 
nature of subjective states with respect to our conventional theories of 
the physical world suggests the possibility of considering other 
anomalous data around consciousness that happen to be objective. 
For such purposes, I propose that we examine the psi data gathered 
under laboratory conditions, which generally receive little attention. I 
wish to consider whether we have theories or frameworks of con-
sciousness that attempt to account for subjective qualia but also fit the 
psi data. I argue that Russellian monism can be combined with an 
argument regarding quantum holism to arrive at a version of cosmo-
psychism that fits very well with the psi data. While I do not argue that 
such a framework exhausts the theoretical possibilities, I do suggest 
we can move forward with a framework that has attractive theoretical 
features and is also consistent with objective data currently on the 
table. 
1. Introduction 
The problem of consciousness is perhaps the most challenging prob-
lem facing scientific enquiry. Essentially, the problem is how to fit 
inherently subjective experiences into our scientific comprehension, 
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arrived at this understanding by evaluating theories using objective, 
third-person-generated data. However, as Nagel (1974) noted, 
accessing the subjective character of experience for other conscious 
organisms is impossible. Our only knowledge of subjective experience 
comes from accessing it directly from the inside. 
Without objective data on the phenomenal nature of our world, it is 
difficult to see how we can truly make progress on explaining con-
sciousness, especially if the correct explanation requires a move seen 
as radical or unpalatable. Those who accept what Chalmers (1996; 
1997) has characterized as the ‘hard problem’ believe that conscious-
ness is likely fundamental in some sense and that physicalist explana-
tions cannot succeed. They have been more willing to explore alterna-
tive frameworks, such as panpsychism (Seager, 1995; Strawson, 2006) 
or neutral monism (Coleman, 2017). However, physicalists who do 
not favour such alternatives will likely be unpersuaded by philo-
sophical arguments that do not also make empirical contact with the 
objective world.1 
While the subjective character of consciousness remains outside the 
reach of objective methods, in order to make progress, I believe we 
should consider somehow expanding the data we use to consider alter-
native explanations of consciousness. Thus, I propose using a set of 
data that is generally characterized as anomalous and falls under the 
umbrella term psi. While these data remain controversial, meta-
analyses across various psi categories indicate strongly significant 
effects. I believe that these data are relevant to the problem of con-
sciousness, so that it is likely a mistake to ignore them. However, 
perhaps many do not accept such data because they perceive difficulty 
in reconciling them with our current scientific understanding. Towards 
addressing this concern, I will explore current directions in the 
philosophy of consciousness and quantum physics that may support 
psi. 
Early in the twentieth century, prominent physicists involved in 
developing quantum mechanics considered the possible connection 
between consciousness and quantum behaviour. Marin (2009) 
observed that, as early as the 1927 Solvay Congress, some of the early 
 
1  See the recent debate between Massimo Pigliucci (physicalist) and Phillip Goff (pan-
psychist) at https://letter.wiki/conversation/277. A key objection from Pigliucci 
regarding Goff’s argument involves the inability of panpsychists to generate testable 
claims. 
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pioneers of quantum mechanics considered the possibility that con-
sciousness and mysticism had some relevance to quantum theory. But 
most quantum physicists have discarded such directions. The present 
work picks up this question, focusing on a possible connection 
between consciousness and quantum mechanics. The persistence of 
two arguably intractable problems — consciousness and the measure-
ment problem of quantum mechanics — makes attractive finding a 
link between these two. 
My paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I argue why 
we should include the psi data in our evaluations for theories of con-
sciousness. In the third section, I explore a theory consistent with such 
data by bringing together two different philosophical threads: 
Russellian monism and quantum holism. Russellian monism has 
recently attracted considerable interest as a way to place conscious-
ness in the physical world while avoiding the problems that plague 
dualism and physicalism. However, it faces a number of challenges of 
its own. I believe that recent work advancing the notion of a common 
ground with quantum mechanics suggests a promising direction. I 
argue that bringing together Russellian monism and quantum holism 
leads towards a version of cosmopsychism, the position that all con-
scious states are aspects of a more fundamental or basic consciousness 
for the cosmos. 
In the fourth section, I discuss how my proposal fits the psi data, as 
well as helps account for our conscious experience. While psi remains 
controversial because it is anomalous with respect to our current 
scientific understanding, I argue that it is not anomalous with respect 
to my proposed framework. Finally, I will offer a conclusion. 
2. Accepting Anomalous Data on Consciousness 
The difficulty of fitting conscious experience into our understanding 
of the world, as well as the impossibility of gathering objective data 
on its phenomenal aspect, has led some philosophers to attack the 
notion of phenomenal consciousness itself. Advocates of illusionism 
usually argue that, instead of truly phenomenal states of experience, 
we access only quasi-phenomenal states that can be reconciled within 
a completely functionalist framework. To make the case for illusion-
ism, Frankish (2016) framed the problem of consciousness in the 
following way: 
Suppose we encounter something that seems anomalous, in the sense of 
being radically inexplicable within our established scientific worldview. 
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Psychokinesis is an example. We would have, broadly speaking, three 
options. First, we could accept that the phenomenon is real and explore 
the implications of its existence, proposing major revisions or exten-
sions to our science, perhaps amounting to a paradigm shift. In the case 
of psychokinesis, we might posit previously unknown psychic forces 
and embark on a major revision of physics to accommodate them. 
Second, we could argue that, although the phenomenon is real, it is not 
in fact anomalous and can be explained within current science. Thus, 
we would accept that people really can move things with their unaided 
minds but argue that this ability depends on known forces, such as 
electromagnetism. Third, we could argue that the phenomenon is 
illusory and set about investigating how the illusion is produced. Thus, 
we might argue that people who seem to have psychokinetic powers are 
employing some trick to make it seem as if they are mentally 
influencing objects. (pp. 12–13) 
I might quibble a bit with the analogy. In the case of psychokinesis, I 
would prefer the opportunity to enquire whether the evidence was 
gathered under controlled conditions, confirmed by other researchers, 
and so on. However, Frankish’s concern here is the debate on con-
sciousness, and I think his analogy illustrates his point well.2 Frankish 
fully accepted that consciousness is anomalous with respect to our 
current scientific explanation, based on the difficulty of accounting for 
basic qualitative experiences (qualia) within a physicalist framework. 
Yet, given strong evidence of confirmation of the main body of 
physicalism, he counselled a conservative approach, arguing against 
exploring any radical moves in scientific theory. Hence, we are 
advised to take up the third option and examine the possibility of 
illusionism. 
For my part, I cannot accept the view that my experiences are 
illusory in the sense that Frankish, Dennett (1991), and other 
illusionists have argued. Instead, I believe that my conscious experi-
ences are real, even if I am mistaken in my interpretation of the 
contents of my experiences, such as when I am dreaming. But I do 
accept that experience remains very difficult for our prevailing 
scientific understanding to explain. Accounting for qualia within our 
current scientific framework remains prohibitively difficult. Following 
the way Frankish framed the problem, this appears to leave us with the 
first option. However, I suggest we can appease the worries of 
Frankish and others by minimizing how we extend our theorizing. 
 
2  I discuss more about anomalous mind–matter interaction later. 
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That is, we might confine our attention to areas where gaps currently 
exist in our understanding of the world. If we target these gaps, 
instead of revising areas that have proved extraordinarily useful, we 
might make progress on the problem of consciousness while having 
little impact on theories that remain on solid ground. I believe that this 
sort of approach is currently being employed with what is being called 
Russellian monism, and I take this up in the next section. 
But returning now to the anomalous character of consciousness, I 
would like to suggest that this arguably troublesome feature presents a 
loophole regarding the epistemological aspect of the hard problem: 
gathering third-person data. The anomalous nature of consciousness 
suggests the possibility that some theories we might develop could 
spill over in the direction of other anomalous features, perhaps in 
ways we could test. What kind of theory and what kind of anomalous 
data remain to be seen. However, it happens that currently various 
kinds of anomalous data exist that are intimately linked to conscious-
ness. These data are generally called psi, which is an umbrella term 
used for such anomalous behaviour as telepathy, clairvoyance, 
precognition, and psychokinesis. 
Of course, the psi data are controversial and often ignored. I believe 
this is unfortunate, especially for the categories of psi examined under 
laboratory conditions and vetted in refereed publications. Neverthe-
less, this research has recently gained more attention in major 
psychology journals (Bem, 2011; Storm, Tressoldi and Di Risio, 
2010), and most recently with Cardeña (2018), who provided a com-
prehensive summary of the extant meta-analyses for psi evidence. 
Cardeña noted that the overall evidence ‘provides cumulative support 
for the reality of psi, which cannot be readily explained away by the 
quality of the studies, fraud, selective reporting, experimental or 
analytical incompetence, or other frequent criticisms’ (p. 663). He also 
noted that the rigour of the psi experimental methodology has 
increased with time, often including analyses for possible publication 
bias as well as the quality of the studies. I discuss this evidence later, 
as well as how it fits with my own proposal. But at this point, we can 
note that we have on the table a considerable amount of anomalous 
but replicated data that could be critical in evaluating various theories 
of consciousness. 
Recently, however, Reber and Alcock (2019) have strongly attacked 
Cardeña’s (2018) presentation and broadly dismissed all of the paper’s 
findings. They did so, however, without citing any flaws in the data or 
methodology. Their arguments against accepting the data were based 
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on what they viewed as the conflict between psi and our current 
scientific understanding. As they put it: 
If the physicalist-materialist framework of modern science is correct 
within the bounds of demonstrability and theoretical coherency — and 
everything that has been learned through science says it is — the fact 
that claimed parapsychological phenomena are so grossly inconsistent 
with that framework suggests that they are all but impossible and that 
the claims made by proponents cannot be true. (p. 392) 
We can note the similarity of this argument to the one used by 
Frankish in regarding phenomenal experience as illusory. But if, 
instead, we have selected the first option mentioned by Frankish (see 
above) and regard our conscious experience as real yet anomalous, we 
might be reluctant to dismiss an additional set of anomalous data 
associated with consciousness, in this case objective laboratory data 
that have been vetted by scientific peers. If we already accept that 
consciousness is anomalous in the sense that its subjective nature does 
not fit with physicalist explanations, the basis for rejecting the psi data 
(because they do not fit with physicalist explanations) is weakened. In 
this regard, I have never encountered a serious criticism of the psi data 
that also acknowledges the hard problem. Of course, phenomenal 
experience and the psi data are anomalous for different reasons; 
physicalist theories have difficulty accounting for qualia, and psi 
phenomena, such as precognition, appear inconsistent with current 
scientific theories. However, if we accept that the psi data are closely 
linked with consciousness, we might consider that these two reflect 
different modes or properties around consciousness, a possibility that 
could motivate us to take a closer look. 
In other words, we might see our problem as an effort to solve a 
giant jigsaw puzzle, where the pieces include our scientific theories as 
well as different sorts of observations. Perhaps consciousness repre-
sents a large empty region where we struggle to gain traction. Here, 
suppose we consider whether the piece representing psi might some-
how be joined with another piece representing subjective experience. 
At first glance, this may seem unlikely. As noted, psi and subjective 
feels remain anomalous in different ways. But perhaps other missing 
pieces involving aspects of the physical world might facilitate some 
kind of fit. As I’ll discuss shortly, recent work on consciousness has 
focused on the deep (intrinsic) nature of matter, where we remain 
ignorant. It seems possible that pieces representing this area could, in 
turn, connect with the parts of our puzzle linked to quantum 
mechanics, where we also struggle to find a satisfactory ontology. 
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Thinking along these lines, an improvement in our understanding of 
the deep nature of matter may lead to an interesting way to fit together 
both the psi data and qualitative experience. 
In the next section, I focus on approaches to consciousness and 
quantum mechanics that have not yet been linked with psi. 
Specifically, this involves a version of cosmopsychism that results 
from combining arguments associated with Russellian monism and 
quantum holism. I believe these arguments will have attractive 
features on their own regarding the hard problem. But I will also argue 
that combining these arguments ultimately provides a framework that 
is consistent with the psi data, which we currently have in hand. If 
successful, we may have a useful framework that accommodates many 
of our best theories. 
3. Linking Russellian Monism 
with Quantum Mechanics 
Russellian monism is generally associated with two arguments made 
by Bertrand Russell (1927). The first is that physics can provide us 
with only a structural or relational understanding of the physical 
world. That is, the ultimates that comprise our world, such as mass 
and velocity, are expressed in terms of mathematical relations to other 
such ultimates. Russell argued that these elegant and mathematical 
frameworks nevertheless leave us ignorant with regards to whatever 
relata ground the relations established in our structural understanding. 
In other words, physics cannot reveal the intrinsic aspect of our 
physical world. 
The second argument is that the best knowledge we have of the 
intrinsic aspect of reality is the direct knowledge we have of the nature 
of our own conscious states. Russell held that these states, which we 
acquire without abstract equations or theories, give us our only knowl-
edge of an intrinsic aspect within the world. These two arguments can 
then be combined to provide a deeply interlinked view of mind and 
matter. Since physics tells us nothing of the intrinsic aspect of our 
physical world, we may posit that this aspect is the same (or has the 
same basis) as our own conscious experiences. 
This argument appears to suggest a way of escaping the problems 
faced by physicalism and dualism. That is, taking consciousness as 
intimately linked with the intrinsic aspect of our physical world 
indicates a way to avoid the radical emergence that physicalism seems 
to require. Also, this union between matter and consciousness at the 
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core of our existence implies that the causal closure of the physical 
world need not present a problem, as it does with dualism. Thus, 
Russellian monism looks very promising for those who view con-
sciousness as fundamental in some sense. But in addition to these 
attractive features, by focusing on an aspect of the world that science 
leaves untouched, Russellian monism arguably avoids the concern 
raised by Frankish (2016) of how to redevelop scientific theories to 
accommodate conscious experience. Thus, it is quite possible that a 
solution to the problem of consciousness via Russellian monism will 
leave much of our scientific theories intact. 
Alter and Nagasawa (2015) provided a useful formulation of 
Russellian monism, arguing that basic properties described by physics 
are structural or relational. They use the term inscrutables to 
characterize properties that ground the physical structure (or relations) 
that physics describes.3 That is, they define inscrutables as ‘natures 
that are not fully characterized by structural/relational descriptions’ (p. 
425). According to Alter and Nagasawa’s formulation of Russellian 
monism, at least some inscrutables are either protophenomenal or 
phenomenal properties.4 Thus, our own experience of consciousness is 
grounded or based in a deeper, fundamental aspect of our world that 
eludes our structural or mathematical frameworks. 
However, it is by no means clear how the vast diversity of 
phenomenal experience arises from such an inscrutable or funda-
mental ground. The most common version of panpsychism addresses 
this issue by positing that some or all subatomic particles possess a 
rudimentary level of consciousness.5 In this framework, the different 
varieties of consciousness presumably result from complex aggregates 
of these particles, which possess micro-experiences. But this leads to 
the combination problem: how do micro-experiences combine to yield 
 
3  Alter and Nagasawa borrowed this term from Montero (2015). However, Lockwood 
(1989) used the phrase ‘inscrutability of matter’ to convey the same notion, attributing it 
to Foster (1982). 
4  Protophenomenal properties require other conditions or properties to instantiate con-
sciousness (Chalmers, 1997). 
5  Brüntrup and Jaskolla (2017) have presented a recent collection of papers that explored 
the attractions and problems of panpsychism. 
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our familiar macro-experiences? Many consider the combination 
problem to be a formidable issue for constitutive panpsychism.6 
However, Alter and Nagasawa (2015) raised another difficulty. As 
we have discussed, inscrutables remain outside of what physics 
reveals. How, then, do we characterize or pin down their nature? 
Although Russellian monism is usually associated with panpsychism 
and neutral monism, Alter and Nagasawa noted that some versions of 
inscrutables are compatible with idealism, dualism, or even physical-
ism. Kind (2015) raised a similar worry; namely, that the inability to 
establish the properties of inscrutables may lead us back towards an 
intractable debate between people with either strong dualist or strong 
physicalist intuitions. Montero (2015), for one, argued for a Russellian 
physicalism where inscrutables are entirely physical yet also provide a 
base for consciousness. While Russellian monism remains attractive, 
the relatively obscure nature of inscrutables threatens to diminish its 
utility. 
3.1. Quantum holism and a common ground 
Making progress within the framework of Russellian monism likely 
requires that we pin down the nature of the inscrutables. This forces us 
to consider what we know or can know about quantum mechanics, the 
most fundamental aspect of the physical world. But quantum 
mechanics remains a branch of physics. Recall that, according to 
Russell, physics delivers an understanding of matter based on 
structuralism. In his own words, ‘the aim of physics, consciously or 
unconsciously, has always been to discover the causal skeleton of the 
world’ (Russell, 1927, p. 391). Alter and Nagasawa (2015) character-
ized this structural understanding as ‘nomic (or causal) spatiotemporal 
structure’ (p. 431). Given all this, what can quantum mechanics reveal 
about the inscrutable nature of our reality? 
Returning to our puzzle metaphor, we might wonder what properties 
quantum mechanics possesses that can be linked with psi. We can note 
some of the psi data, such as remote viewing, appear to exhibit 
puzzling nonlocal correlations. Of course, it happens that the property 
of entanglement between subatomic particles also shows nonlocal 
correlations across arbitrary distances. As is well known, Einstein, 
 
6  Seager (1995) discussed the problem and coined the term combination problem; how-
ever, James (1890) recognized the problem earlier and characterized it vividly. See 
Chalmers (2017) for a recent overview. 
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Podolsky and Rosen (1935) argued that the nonlocal nature of 
entanglement indicated that the theory was incomplete. However, Bell 
(1964) showed that the EPR thought experiment generated contra-
dictions with quantum mechanical predictions, which have been con-
firmed experimentally. Thus, the nonlocal nature of quantum 
mechanics appears to be established. 
Before going further, I wish to address the use of the terms nonlocal 
versus non-separable within the literature. The term nonlocal is often 
used to characterize the property of entanglement, involving modal 
correlations between separated entities. However, Ney (2020) has 
recently noted that the term is often associated with a causal 
connection between objects within space-time, which conflicts with 
special relativity. Ney has advocated the term non-separable, which, 
she argued, can be understood within the context of a high-
dimensional ‘space’, through which entangled entities are connected, 
rather than our more familiar space-time. This notion of a high-
dimensional space is the basis for wave function realism, the position 
advocated by Ney (2020), Albert (2013), and others that the extra-
ordinary number of dimensions required by the wave function (due to 
entanglement) point towards an ontologically real high-dimensional 
space.7 Ismael and Shaffer (2020), whose proposal of a quantum 
ground I wish to discuss, also have chosen the term non-separable 
rather than nonlocal, and their argument is also consistent with wave 
function realism. However, all this said, in this paper I retain use of 
the term nonlocal to characterize the modal correlations between 
quantum entities, primarily because that term has often been used to 
characterize psi phenomena. I prefer to maintain consistency and 
avoid confusion. However, I will not use the term to suggest any 
causal relationships, unless explicitly stated. 
Ismael and Schaffer’s (2020) proposal is framed around their 
argument that the nature of quantum mechanics reveals nonlocality in 
the sense that nature ‘allows spatiotemporally separated entities to 
have states that cannot be fully specified without reference to each 
other’ (p. 4131). This entanglement between states of entities, they 
 
7  The notion of a quantum field inhabiting high-dimensional space, advocated by Albert 
and others, should not be confused with quantum field theory, which attempts to extend 
quantum mechanics to incorporate more classical fields, as well as special relativity. 
Also, wave function realism is distinct from von Neumann’s argument that quantum 
superpositions described by the wave function constitute real aspects of the world’s 
ontology. 
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argue, cannot be understood in terms of causal relationships between 
such entities. Instead, such correlated behaviour between entities is 
most likely consistent with the presence of a common ground that 
‘coordinates the randomness’ between the possible states. While this 
common ground is not described in the quantum formalism, they 
argued that it can be inferred from the behaviour of the correlated 
entities. For Ismael and Schaffer, this common ground establishes a 
metaphysical relationship between relatively derivative entities, the 
particles that constitute our world, with what they characterize as 
ontologically prior. Thus, the distinct components of entangled 
systems are ultimately grounded in an integrated whole, ontologically 
fundamental to the components. 
The notion of a quantum ground that Ismael and Schaffer proposed 
arguably provides an attractive candidate for the Russellian inscruta-
ble, whose nature cannot be characterized fully in structural or 
relational descriptions. Of course, quantum formalism contains a great 
deal of structure. However, Ismael and Schaffer’s inference of a 
common ground made no explicit reference to such within the 
formalism. Thus, their notion of a quantum ground appears to require 
something non-structural (not captured within the quantum formalism) 
that influences the system of entangled quantum states as a whole. 
Ismael and Schaffer described this as a metaphysical ground, 
ontologically prior to the quantum system, inhabiting a high-
dimensional space and thus not confined to the causal, spatio-temporal 
order. Its inherently holistic influence intimates a fundamental and 
nonlocal unity across all spatio-temporally separated entities. Its status 
as a metaphysical ground that holistically orchestrates the relation-
ships between quantum states suggests a promising candidate for 
whatever ultimately grounds the relationships described by physics. 
Based on its non-structural and fundamental properties, we have 
reason to focus our attention here as the Russellian inscrutable. Thus, 
this quantum ground within wave function space is also an attractive 
candidate for the basis of consciousness. As I’ll discuss later, the 
inherently nonlocal nature of this quantum ground leads us towards a 
view that the universe as a whole is conscious. 
3.2. Potentia as the intrinsic aspect of matter 
The question of intrinsic nature leads us to ask, what is the something 
or stuff that lives in this high-dimensional ground? Although advo-
cates of wave function realism such as Albert and Ney are 
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physicalists, Russellian monism gives us reason to think that this most 
basic entity is the ground for consciousness as well as quantum 
behaviour. And, as we have discussed, this most basic entity is ontol-
ogically prior to the various outcomes of experiments, as well as, in 
general, the particles that constitute our world. Thus, it seems 
reasonable that we might call this stuff potential matter or ‘potentia’. 
Although this idea of ‘potentia’ is not widely embraced by physicists, 
the notion is important historically and it does have some contempo-
rary advocates. 
Heisenberg (1958) proposed applying the term, which he attributed 
to Aristotle, within the context of the Copenhagen interpretation to 
represent the superpositions of possible states that exist before 
measurement. That is, Heisenberg held that superposed states repre-
sented real tendencies or potentialities that would instantiate upon 
measurement. Recently, Kastner, Kauffman and Epperson (2018) have 
proposed using Heisenberg’s notion of potentia within what they 
describe as a dualistic framework (although in their view distinct from 
substance dualism). Their framework also follows the Copenhagen 
postulate in holding that measurement triggers superposed states (in 
potentia) to transition into the observed states upon measurement. 
This notion also has been expressed extensively by Stapp within 
von Neumann’s framework of Processes I and II. Stapp (2017) 
follows Heisenberg’s (1958) proposal of incorporating potentia or real 
tendencies into the notion of quantum superposition associated with 
the Copenhagen framework. However, Stapp introduced two 
additional modifications that are interesting for our purposes. First, he 
argued that this domain of potentia can be characterized as mind-like.8 
Second, Stapp characterized actual experimental outcomes (resulting 
from wave function collapse) as the ‘choice of nature’ in response to 
the experimenter’s choices. Thus, building on von Neumann’s frame-
work, Stapp made the case for both our own volition and that of 
nature. And, while Stapp described this framework as dualistic in a 
pragmatic sense, he also maintained that a mind-like monism of nature 
is fundamental to both Processes I and II. 
Here, I suggest that incorporating the notion of quantum potentia 
into the intrinsic aspect of matter offers a more parsimonious approach 
 
8  See also Radin (1997), who explored, in the context of explaining psi phenomena, the 
possibility that consciousness has roots in a nonlocal quantum field, characterized by 
probabilities (pp. 158–60). 
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than some version of dualism or a framework that retains quantum 
superposition. Many physicists are understandably reluctant to 
embrace a concept that implies a version of dualism or appears to add 
something unobservable to the world’s ontology. However, Russellian 
monism gives us reason to believe a deeper ontology exists — the 
intrinsic nature of the matter — beyond what physics can reveal. 
Thus, we have reason to put some weight on this notion of quantum 
potentia as the ultimate base or ground for the world. Moreover, the 
ontologically prior nature of this quantum ground, residing outside of 
space-time, suggests a way of accommodating the nonlocal correla-
tions of quantum states without violating relativity. In addition, this 
notion of ‘potentia’, as the intrinsic aspect of matter within a high-
dimensional ground, obviates the necessity of wave function 
‘collapse’. 
3.3. Quantum interpretations 
Assuming this is true or at least a reasonable thing to consider, what 
might this suggest about the correct interpretation of quantum 
mechanics? Ismael and Schaffer (2020) remained neutral and declined 
to speculate on which interpretation their notion of quantum ground 
might favour. However, in my view, their proposal has at least the 
flavour of a hidden variables approach. That is, something not 
referenced within the formalism nevertheless coordinates the proba-
bilities, and thus orchestrates the relationships, between possible 
quantum states.  
The various interpretations of quantum mechanics try to explain the 
measurement problem: the apparent transition from the wave function 
(a superposition of possible states) to the observed experimental 
outcomes. Given the persistence of the problem, it is tempting to 
consider that the influence of the quantum ground we have been 
considering plays a role here as well. That is, perhaps this quantum 
ground possesses nomological (law-like) properties that guide sub-
atomic particles beyond what is captured by the wave function 
towards their observed states, while also accommodating Stapp’s 
notion that nature itself makes a ‘choice’. But if this quantum ground 
is indeed the Russellian inscrutable, and therefore grounds phenom-
enal properties, this leads us not so much in the direction of Bohm’s 
(1952) version of hidden variables (which is fully deterministic), but 
towards his later work on the ‘implicate order’ (Bohm, 1980; Bohm 
and Hiley, 1993). Indeed, Bohm in this later work proposed that an 
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ontologically deeper ground, existing in the high-dimensional con-
figuration space and providing the basis for both mind and matter, 
governed the behaviour of quantum systems through ‘active informa-
tion’. Bohm and Hiley also described this high-dimensional space as a 
domain of potentialities or potential flux, which I view as consistent 
with the notion of potentia I have considered. Also, this approach, like 
Bohm’s earlier hidden variable theory, obviates the need for wave 
function ‘collapse’. 
Thus, my proposal shares features with both Bohm and Stapp, while 
maintaining some differences. Both Bohm (1980) and Stapp (2017) 
proposed that real potentialities, within what we might call a quantum 
ground, provide the foundation for both mind and matter. While they 
both created room for free agency, Stapp (2017) more explicitly 
embraced the role that volition plays in bringing about outcomes. 
However, Bohm (1980) proposed a neutral monist framework, in 
contrast to my more explicitly phenomenal base. Stapp’s potentialities 
are mind-like; however, he retained the collapse postulate of the 
orthodox framework, while I do not. 
The possibility that the intrinsic aspect of the world provides the 
foundation for agency (as well as consciousness) has recently been 
explored by Mørch (2020). Mørch noted that various philosophers of 
historical importance have argued that our direct experience of agency 
likely leads us towards an understanding of true causation. Thus, 
introspection on our ability to make real choices arguably gives us 
some understanding for the basis of causation in the world at large. 
Ismael and Schaffer (2020) stopped short of characterizing the causal 
relationship between the ontologically prior ground and a given 
system under investigation. But perhaps our considerations of the 
quantum ground as the basis for phenomenal experience also suggest 
this basis as the foundation for agency as well. 
To recap, I submit that we have good reasons for viewing the 
quantum ground as an attractive candidate for the Russellian inscruta-
ble. Thus, we are led towards a view of the intrinsic aspect of our 
world as an ontologically prior, nonlocal ground of potentialities 
fundamental to our spatio-temporal order. Moreover, Russellian 
monism suggests that this deeper stratum of potentialities is the 
ground of our experience, and perhaps true agency as well. As I shall 
discuss, these attributes, which include nonlocality, ground of 
potentialities, and a foundation for experience and volition, will 
provide a framework that fits well with the psi data. 
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3.4. Wave function cosmopsychism 
The universal nature of this quantum ground moves this proposal into 
the family of cosmopsychism, the view that all conscious experiences 
possessed by humans or animals are aspects of or derive from the con-
sciousness of the cosmos.9 The primary attraction of cosmopsychism 
is its ability to avoid the combination problem we mentioned earlier. 
According to Goff (2017), all conscious experiences are grounded via 
subsumption in the consciousness of the whole universe.10 Other 
recent explorations of cosmopsychism include Nagasawa and Wager 
(2017), Shani (2015), and Shani and Keppler (2018).11 Most of these 
are heavily indebted to Schaffer’s (2010) work proposing that the 
cosmos is the one truly fundamental and whole object, and thus 
ontologically prior to all of the more derivative objects within the 
universe.12 However, with the notable exception of Shani and Keppler 
(2018), much current work does not attempt to link theories of cosmo-
psychism with quantum mechanics. 
Shani and Keppler’s (2018) version of cosmopsychism hinges on a 
non-standard modification of quantum field theory known as 
stochastic electrodynamics (SED), which describes an ‘all-pervasive 
electromagnetic background field’, called the zero-point field (ZPF), 
pervading the universe.13 Within this framework, physical systems 
become conscious through suitably coupling with the ZPF, which they 
argued is the source of conscious experience. Shani and Keppler 
described ‘phase-locked modes’ as key mechanisms that interact with 
the ZPF in a way that facilitates filter-like extraction of ‘states of 
consciousness from the phenomenal color palette immanent in the 
ZPF’ (2018, p. 399). 
 
9  The case that this ground contains only mental properties also yields a version of 
cosmic idealism. I retain here the label cosmopsychism because I believe this ground 
may contain both mental and non-mental properties. Chalmers (2020) discussed the 
distinctions between varieties of panpsychism and idealism. 
10  Goff’s grounding by subsumption can be illustrated as follows: my entire experience of 
enjoying a picnic lunch in a park with green grass subsumes my experience of a patch 
of green. 
11  See also Laszlo (2007) for explorations of a fundamental information field, motivated 
from speculative extensions of quantum field theory. 
12  Kafatos and Nadeau (2000) also argued that we can infer the universe to be conscious, 
due to its holistic, nonlocal nature, from which conscious creatures have emerged. 
13  This framework builds on earlier work by Keppler (2012; 2016) that presents the ZPF 
as the fundamental field supporting conscious experience. 
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However, this proposed ZPF field arguably provides a substantially 
different ontology from Ismael and Schaffer’s high-dimensional 
ground. While Shani and Keppler argued that their theory can account 
for entanglement and other quantum behaviour, there does not appear 
to be any additional nonlocal behaviour inherent in their framework. I 
submit that my proposal of a nonlocal ground of aware potentiality is 
better positioned to accommodate the psi data. However, at the present 
time Shani and Keppler’s theory is more fully developed than my 
own. Perhaps their framework can be adapted to account for the psi 
data. Going forward, I will focus on my own proposal.  
I believe that characterizing the fundamental quantum ground as an 
inherently aware unified domain of potentialities has some significant 
implications and advantages. Of course, it must be said that the idea of 
the universe as a whole being conscious in any sense might be hard to 
swallow. However, the idea is straightforward if we take the universal 
quantum ground as a fundamental, non-separable entity. In this view, 
all particles are aspects of this vast, ontologically prior, field or 
ground. Under Russellian monism, we can also understand that 
various conscious experiences are aspects of this phenomenal base. 
Hence, we avoid the problem of understanding how sentient particles 
combine to produce more familiar states of consciousness. However, 
this proposal faces the decombination problem: how the more 
derivative conscious experiences of humans and animals arise from 
such a phenomenal quantum ground.  
Concerning decombination, here I will offer only a preliminary 
approach. We might frame the problem as follows: given a nonlocal 
and universal quantum ground as a base for phenomenal properties, 
how can we account for conscious experience in a local physical 
system? I suggest that the property of quantum contextuality indicates 
a direction. Quantum contextuality indicates that the measurements of 
quantum observables ultimately depend on other (entangled) observa-
bles, as well as all physical details of the experimental set-up.14 Thus, 
the wave function and experimental outcomes are critically and 
holistically dependent on all facets of the quantum system. This 
holistic sensitivity between quantum behaviour and its associated 
physical system may suggest that certain configurations, also situated 
 
14  Contextuality in this sense is often understood to rule out hidden variable interpreta-
tions; however, this does not apply to Bohm’s nonlocal hidden variable approaches or to 
what I present here. 
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in the quantum (phenomenal) ground, interact with this meta-
physically foundational source in a way that supports experience.  
My own intuition suggests that biological systems are probably 
necessary to support conscious experience. Perhaps biological systems 
have properties that allow a sort of quantum extraction of experience 
from the phenomenal base of the quantum ground. As it happens, the 
emerging field of quantum biology is identifying quantum properties 
in a growing number of biological processes. Marais et al. (2018) 
have recently presented a current overview of how energy transport 
processes, such as photosynthesis and enzyme catalysis, exhibit 
quantum mechanical properties such as quantum coherence. They also 
cited preliminary theories and data supporting quantum properties 
associated with aviary migration, olfaction, and cognition. Perhaps 
this growing field will eventually show the kind of links between 
biology and quantum mechanics that support conscious experience 
along the lines I have explored. 
Thus, a physical (biological) system with the right properties may 
support a range of qualitative feels extracted from an ontologically 
prior phenomenal base. Borrowing Shani and Keppler’s (2018) notion 
of a filter (but using a different ontology), I suggest that such a system 
extracts an aspect of conscious experience from the quantum ground 
and foundational ‘phenomenal palette’.15 Shani and Keppler also 
speculated that such consciousness-supporting mechanisms extend 
down to the level of subatomic particles (albeit to a rudimentary 
degree). However, I suggest that a higher degree of information flow 
may be required for consciousness, such as that found in biological 
systems. We might imagine a radio tuned to a specific station that 
plays a particular format of music. Such a radio produces a range of 
music, depending on to which frequency the device is tuned. With this 
notion of a filtering process extracting a range of experience from a 
phenomenal ground, the particular qualia experienced by a bat, worm, 
or frog result from how key systems of their physiology interact 
holistically with an ontologically deeper field of aware potentiality. 
Within this preliminary sketch, important questions remain as to 
how various cognitive mechanisms involving memory, perception, 
and motor control integrate with core experiential processes. 
 
15  Also, within the parapsychology literature, Kelly et al. (2007) built on the work of 
William James and F.W.H. Myers to argue that a brain as filtering mechanism can 
accommodate a wide range of psi phenomena. 
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Presumably, systems of neurons associated with these and other 
conscious (or unconscious) cognitive processes are intimately linked 
with this notion of quantum filtering. Thus, various inputs from the 
sensory, memory, or other cognitive systems likely modulate this 
filtering process, producing various possible conscious experiences 
based on the organism’s biology.  
4. Explaining Conscious Experience 
and the Psi Data 
To recap, I have argued in favour of developing more curiosity around 
theories of consciousness that can be linked with the anomalous data 
known as psi. I then explored a promising class of theories that so far 
has not been linked to any of the psi data. Russellian monism has con-
siderable appeal in helping us avoid unattractive features of dualism 
and physicalism, but it also faces its own serious challenges. To side-
step these challenges, I have sought to identify the Russellian inscruta-
ble with the notion of the quantum ground as the ontologically prior 
basis of our world. Given the property of entanglement, this becomes 
essentially the quantum ground for the universe. In this way, we 
obtain a version of cosmopsychism where phenomenal (and physical) 
properties are based in a high-dimensional ‘space’ of potentiality. 
We can note how this framework accounts for some common, yet 
poorly understood, aspects of our experience. The subjective feels 
(qualia) of experience arise from a deeper ground of phenomenal 
resources, depending on how the biological structure of an organism 
interacts with the quantum ground. Instead of combining micro-
experiences, the physical body acts like something of a filter, in turn 
extracting combinations of qualia from the phenomenal base of the 
quantum ground. Also, perhaps we need not treat our first-hand 
experience of agency as an illusion. That is, just as our conscious 
experience is derived from a deeper field of phenomenal properties, 
our experience of volition may be derived from this ontologically 
fundamental ground as well.  
However, it so happens that this proposal is also consistent with the 
laboratory psi data. I do not presently claim to make new predictions 
that we can test using objective, empirical methods, although I am 
hopeful that these can eventually be obtained, perhaps with refinement 
of the general framework. In the meantime, I do believe that the set-up 
I have described supports a worldview where the psi data can be taken 
seriously. Earlier, I explained why the tendency to dismiss or ignore 
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these data based on the reasoning that they do not square with 
physicalist assumptions is misguided (phenomenal experience also 
does not fit well with physicalist assumptions). Another common 
objection against psi is that it lacks a theoretical framework. While I 
do not argue here that my proposal exhausts the theoretical possi-
bilities, I believe I have made good use of some theories currently on 
the table to provide a framework that supports the psi data.  
In what I have proposed, the foundation of phenomenal experience 
is a shared ‘space’, albeit one that is nonlocal and high-dimensional. 
Thus, our consciousness (or perhaps our unconsciousness) may be 
ultimately rooted in the universal quantum ground, again character-
ized as an underlying stratum of potentialities, possessing a wealth of 
intrinsic information that underlies our universe. Searching for other 
words, perhaps our conscious experience is more wave-like or ‘spread 
out’ than our conventional understanding leads us to believe. Perhaps 
this could support experiences of hunches or intuitions that are often 
dismissed, yet happen to be veridical. Overall, I consider that the 
inherently probabilistic and nonlocal nature of this common ground 
presents something that fits with a number of different modes of psi. 
For convenience, I draw heavily on Cardeña’s (2018) recent pre-
sentation, which summarized all of the major meta-analyses on psi 
studies conducted recently and throughout the previous century.16 I 
also present here a condensed version of his tables reporting the 
results of the meta-analyses across various psi categories.17 These 
include the meta-analyses of all various modes of psi, including 
telepathy, clairvoyance, precognition, presentiment, and mind–matter 
interaction (psychokinesis). 
4.1. Telepathy and clairvoyance 
In the case of telepathy, the table shows findings for three different 
empirical designs: forced-choice card guessing, ganzfeld, and psi 
 
16  The forced-choice card experiments, conducted in 1937, are the earliest psi studies 
included in Cardeña’s summaries. 
17  To economize on space and limit some of the discussion, I omitted a few of the reported 
psi modes and statistics that did not include Z statistics or the number of studies. Also, I 
did not report the effect sizes, which are based on different methods for different psi 
categories. In addition, I only reported statistics that include all of the studies of a given 
experimental design, while Cardeña also included subsets that removed outliers, 
imposed homogeneity, or used some other criteria. 
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dream studies.18 With respect to remote viewing, my table also shows 
the results of two meta-analyses, those by Milton (1997) and Dunne 
and Jahn (2003).19 Remote viewing is a technique where the partici-
pant describes a place, chosen at random, where a sender is located.20 
As the astronomically small p values indicate, all meta-analyses for 
telepathy and clairvoyance are highly significant. 
 
 # Studies Z p 
Forced-Choice Cards 
 Honorton and Ferrari (1989) 








6.3 x 10–25 
10–16 
Ganzfeld 







Psi Dream Studies 






2.72 x 10–7 
Remote Viewing 
 Milton (1997) 








2.46 x 10–9 
3 x 10–8 
Precognition 






1.2 x 10–10 
Presentiment 






5.7 x 10–8 
Dice 















Global Consciousness Project 






2.34 x 10–13 
Table 1. A subset of the meta-analysis summaries of various psi modes, 
adapted from Cardeña (2018). Z = the cumulative standard deviation from 
the mean; p = the statistical likelihood of obtaining the test results while 
assuming the null hypothesis is correct. I limit the results taken from 
Cardeña to the modes of psi that I discuss here. In his tables, Cardeña 
also included psi studies such as non-contact healing and remote influence 
that did not report the Z values. 
 
18  Please see Cardeña (2018) for more details, as well as the respective meta-analyses. 
19  Cardeña also reported the results of other meta-analyses on remote viewing, but which 
were unaccompanied by information on the number of studies. Thus, I elected to 
exclude them here. 
20  Most experiments have the sender in the present, but some place her or him in some 
place at a future time. Please see Cardeña (2018) for more details. 
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How might my proposal fit with telepathy and clairvoyance? I believe 
that seeing the quantum ground as the source of phenomenal 
properties permits anomalous sharing of information consistent with 
the empirical data. For telepathy, I am not suggesting that some sort of 
signal is transferred between minds.21 But I believe my framework is 
consistent with our conscious experience being ultimately linked with 
the quantum ground at a more fundamental level of reality that also 
grounds experience. Thus, our consciousness or unconsciousness 
likely accesses a deeper domain that we share with other minds. But 
something like this could also provide an explanation for remote 
viewing as well. That is, if our consciousness connects with an under-
lying and inherently nonlocal ground that is integral with our world, 
we could have unconventional access to information on the environ-
ment, perhaps very far away. This framework appears to support the 
sort of intuitive flashes that we cannot explain through conventional 
channels of information. That this framework provides a story that 
supports both telepathy and clairvoyance comports well with the 
difficulty of disentangling the two that has been noted in the psi 
literature (Radin, 1997, pp. 67–8). 
4.2. Precognition and presentiment 
Precognition and presentiment are two other forms of psi that suggest 
processes outside our conventional and linear notions of time. Table 1 
includes the meta-analyses based on Bem’s style of implicit pre-
cognition experiments, which essentially time-reverses otherwise 
standard tasks studied in psychology. For example, in one case the 
participant is primed with various words after he makes his selection, 
reversing the normal sequence of the experiment. The meta-analyses 
based on 90 different studies found highly significant effects (Bem et 
al., 2016).22 
The characterization of the ontologically prior aspect of our world 
as a domain of potentialities, operating outside of our spatio-temporal 
 
21  While quantum entanglement entails correlation between entities, it does not permit 
communication (or for that matter any causal interaction) between them. However, I 
will briefly suggest another mode of anomalous communication between sender and 
receiver below. 
22  Presentiment, another psi mode, involves the detection of various physiological shifts 
that precede a stimulus. Mossbridge, Tressoldi and Utts (2012) found significant 
evidence in the 26 studies that they collected. 
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order, suggests a way to interpret experiments on precognition and 
presentiment. If our consciousness is rooted in such a domain, then 
perhaps our unconsciousness has access to potentialities that corres-
pond to future states. Such access might be accompanied by a feeling 
or intuition about a future event, as well as, perhaps, by unconscious 
physiological responses (presentiment). For me, this interpretation is 
more palatable than an alternative proposal of retrocausation 
(Sheehan, 2015). Precognition and presentiment may reflect an ability 
to perceive or access (unconsciously, in the case of presentiment) such 
potentialities residing within a nonlocal ground of awareness.23 
4.3. Psychokinesis 
Table 1 also includes overall statistics that reflect extant studies on 
three categories of psychokinesis or mind–matter interaction: the 
effect of mental intention on dice (Radin and Ferrari, 1991), micro-PK 
(Bosch, Steinkamp and Boller, 2006), and the Global Consciousness 
Project (Nelson, 2015). The combined results for studies investigating 
the effect of mental intention on dice rolling, compiled by Radin and 
Ferrari (1991), suggest small, yet significant, effects.  
The latter two mind–matter interaction methodologies use quantum 
processes to produce true random streams of digital 1s and 0s. Micro-
PK investigates the ability of participants to influence the output 
through mental intention. Bosch, Steinkamp and Boller (2006) 
gathered the extant micro-PK studies and confirmed small, but 
statistically significant, effects. They were cautious in drawing their 
conclusion, highlighting the heterogeneous nature of the studies. After 
noting their overall high quality, they suggested that publication bias 
might be the most plausible explanation. However, Radin et al. (2006) 
argued that invoking publication bias would require an implausible 
number (1,500) of unpublished studies. 
I submit that mental intention might influence physical processes 
through the capacity of the mind to influence the potentialities that 
ground our world. That is, psychokinesis likely requires the capability 
to influence or imprint on this quantum ground. However, psycho-
kinesis as discussed in the literature appears to presume some degree 
of true agency. As I have observed, my proposal supports this notion 
 
23  Within his implicate order framework, which is also based in a high-dimensional 
quantum ground, Bohm (1996) has previously conjectured that precognition may 
involve the ability to sense potentialities. 
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of volition. However, this sort of influence likely involves a larger 
number of factors than the other modes of psi we have explored. 
These could include the dispositions and characteristics of the sender, 
the receiver, and the environment. The holistic nature of the quantum 
ground appears to complicate greatly such a transfer of intention or 
information. With this in mind, we can note that the statistical 
significance associated with psychokinesis (with the exception of the 
GCP) is considerably smaller than other modes of psi, such as Bem-
style precognition, presentiment, and ganzfeld telepathy.24 This likely 
indicates smaller effect sizes, relative to other modes of psi, and 
reflects the difficulty of influencing the quantum ground relative to 
merely accessing information.25 
To return to Frankish’s (2016) criticism, recall that he argued that 
psychokinesis would necessitate new psychic forces. This is not 
necessarily wrong. Contrary to Frankish’s concern, however, my pro-
posal does not revise anything in our well-established scientific under-
standing. Rather, it is confined to the gaps in our understanding of 
consciousness and quantum mechanics. I submit that our intention 
may have some influence on the deeper, nonlocal, and probabilistic 
level of reality. (This is not the sort of stuff dramatized in superhero 
movies.) The bottom line is that we need not dismiss the psi data, nor 
deny the qualia of our direct experience. Quite the contrary, both types 
of data are likely necessary for us to improve our understanding of 
consciousness. 
Nelson’s (2015) Global Consciousness Project (GCP) explores the 
data produced by a network of random number devices positioned 
around the world. The GCP investigates whether the digital output 
from these devices is influenced during times of important (perhaps 
global) events, such as the terrorist attack on 11 September 2001. 
Nelson’s hypothesis is that the random output of these devices is 
influenced by a kind of resonance, as large numbers of individuals 
respond emotionally to a given event.26 Previously, I speculated that 
 
24  I did not report the effect sizes for various modes of psi. The different methodologies 
used appear to have resulted in different notions of effect sizes, making comparison 
across psi modes difficult. However, the small effect size reported in Bosch, Steinkamp 
and Boller (2006) is reflected in the relatively small p value, which I do report. 
25  A similar story might account for an alternative version of telepathy, where the sender 
could influence the common quantum ground shared by sender and receiver. 
26  Of course, unlike the version of micro-PK we discussed briefly above, the populations 
presumably affecting these RNG devices have no knowledge of their existence. 
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groups of individuals sharing a common emotion caused by an 
important global (or possibly more local) event could influence the 
quantum ground of potentialities (Williams, 2013).27 Nelson’s GCP 
arguably deserves to be distinguished from the other modes of mind–
matter interaction, possibly representing its own unique category. 
Cardeña (2018) noted that the effect size for the GCP appears to be 
substantially larger than for other modes of psychokinesis. Of course, 
the GCP does, indeed, seem to be something very different: relatively 
large groups of people sharing a common emotional reaction in con-
trast to single individuals attempting to influence an RNG device 
through mental intention. However, while the GCP might arguably be 
characterized as a different mode of psi from other psychokinesis 
experiments, it nevertheless appears to fit reasonably well into this 
proposed framework. 
Overall, I believe this framework appears to be a reasonably good fit 
with the different modes of psi we have on the table. However, while 
it is consistent with the psi data, the relationship between the theory 
and the data is a relatively loose one. That is, it is difficult for me to 
see how explicit parameter estimates on psi effects might be genera-
ted, even if the theory is enhanced. That said, we can note that this 
quantum ground cosmopsychism is not only consistent with psi, it is 
consistent with the typically modest or small size of the psi effects. In 
other words, the inherently holistic nature of the wave function, which 
implies a large number of relevant factors, appears to be consistent 
with the small or modest effect sizes that characterize the psi 
literature. 
5. Conclusion 
My central aim here is to ask what theories or frameworks of con-
sciousness currently on the table cohere well with taking seriously 
objective, anomalous data pertaining to consciousness. Of course, it is 
also important that the theory be consistent with conventional data. 
But throughout the history of science, anomalies have played a key 
role in facilitating scientific breakthroughs. Recognizing this import-
ant historical role hopefully justifies looking for ways of expanding 
 
27  In the paper, I borrowed from Bohm’s notion of an implicate order within the quantum 
ground, which has important similarities to the version of cosmopsychism I explore 
here. 
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the set of data we typically use in order to make progress on 
consciousness. 
In considering this possibility, I have explored integrating 
Russellian monism with quantum mechanics in a way that suggests 
that the quantum ground is a base for phenomenal resources. This 
version of cosmopsychism can be characterized as an ontologically 
prior, nonlocal domain of aware potentia. As I have mentioned above, 
I believe such an approach has the virtues of helping us pin down the 
inscrutability of matter, as well as providing a path towards avoiding 
the combination problem. Aside from these theoretical virtues, I 
believe it also fits well with several different modes of psi data that 
meta-analyses show we ought to be taking seriously. 
However, to those who object to using the psi data, I would ask, 
given the persistent difficulty of the mind–body problem as well as its 
anomalous nature, what anomalous data would you find acceptable? 
And if we decide at the outset to rule out using anomalous data of any 
kind (apart from phenomenal experience itself), can we truly expect to 
make progress on the problem of consciousness, relying only on 
philosophical arguments? For me, the data on psi will likely be 
essential for us to make progress on exploring this problem that has 
remained obstinate for centuries. 
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